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Abstract
In this work we propose a theory of gossip as a means for social control. Exercising social control roughly means to
isolate and to punish cheaters. However, punishment is costly and it inevitably implies the problem of second-order
cooperation. Moving from a cognitive model of gossip, we report data from ethnographic studies and agent-based
simulations to support our claim that gossip reduces the costs of social control without lowering its efficacy.
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1. Introduction
If one were to enumerate the most influential and uni-
versal social behaviors in human societies, gossip would
undoubtedly be one of them. Exchanging social infor-
mation is fundamental for partner selection, social con-
trol, and coalition formation, just to name some of its
main functions. In social groups, humans exchange
information about other individuals, their actions,
behaviors and attitudes, and social issues have been
proven to be among the most recurring topics of
human conversations.1
Gossip is an influential theme also in research, as
witnessed by the huge amount of studies carried out
on it by scholars coming from different disciplines.
Since the appearance of Gluckman’s2 article in 1963,
in which gossip was defined as a ‘culturally controlled
game with important social functions’ (p. 312), several
researchers endeavored to unveil these functions.
Almost 50 years later, the list of functions served by
gossip is far from being definitive and there is a lack of
agreement on both its ultimate and its proximate causes
(for example, see the contributions by Barkow,3
Goodman and Ben-Ze’ev,4 Dunbar,5 Gintis et al.,6
Baumeister et al.,7 Wert and Salovey,8 and Piazza and
Bering9).
One of the proposed functions of gossip is the
management of reputation.10 Theories of indirect reci-
procity explain large-scale human cooperation in terms
of conditional helping by individuals who want to
uphold a reputation and then to be included in future
cooperation.11 Reputational information can also help
to solve the tragedy of commons,12 a social dilemma
referring to the fact that when everyone benefits from
an intact resource, there is an individual advantage to
cheat (e.g. overexploit or pollute), because cheating
brings economic advantages to the executor, whereas
costs are distributed among all group members.13
In economic experiments, the possibility of recording
other players’ reputations actually prevents the public
resource from being overused.14 Economic experiments
from traditional societies all over the world have pro-
vided strong support to the idea that reputational
concerns can promote cooperation and altruistic behav-
iors.6,15 However, many influential economists believe
that reputation, along with kin selection and reciprocal
altruism, offers a rather incomplete picture of those
evolutionary forces that shaped human cooperation,16
and propose to explain cooperation among selfish unre-
lated individuals in terms of ‘strong reciprocity’, which
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‘is characterized by the willingness to altruistically
reward cooperative acts and to altruistically punish
norm-violating, defecting behaviors’ (Fehr and
Schneider,17 p. 1315; for the debate between supporters
of the strong reciprocity theory and its critics see Fehr
and Schneider17 and Burnham and Hare18).
Although extremely interesting, there are still open
questions, such as: how can cooperation evolve in
mixed groups in which cooperators are exploited by
cheaters? How can cooperators be protected against
retaliation or how can they deal with second-order
punishment?
A solution to this issue has been often found in
social control, a rather complex phenomenon on
which there is a great deal of scientific work, neither
conclusive nor consistent. Unfortunately, for social
control to work, and then to achieve high benefits
costs must be high as well. How could this costly solu-
tion have evolved?
In this paper, we will present social control as a cul-
turally evolved decision tree, with branches standing for
different alternatives for decisions possibly evolved in
different phases of the human cultural evolution.
Starting from the analysis of costs and benefits of dif-
ferent types of social control, we will ask ourselves
under which conditions it is possible to optimize it.
Next, we will put forward a model of social evaluation,
including reputation. From this model, we will derive
some properties of gossip as a process that circulates
reputation. Thanks to these properties, gossip will be
shown to have a strong adaptive advantage over alter-
native modalities of social control, entailing lower costs
without reducing its benefits.
The organization of the paper follows the reasoning
along which the whole argument is unfolded. In
Section 2, we model social control as a decision tree
in which costs and benefits of identification and reac-
tion are analyzed and discussed. In Section 3 we intro-
duce our cognitively grounded theory of gossip, and we
put forward our hypothesis about the role of gossip for
social control. Section 4 is intended as a bridge between
the theory (Sections 1–3) and the data (Sections 4–6). In
Section 5 we check whether our model of gossip and the
properties we analyze are backed up by etnographic
evidence, whereas Section 6 is devoted to test through
agent-based simulation whether our hypothesis on
gossip for social control matches simulation data.
Finally, in Section 7 some conclusions are drawn and
ideas for future work are outlined.
2. Social control as a decision tree
Social control is generally viewed as a conceptual cate-
gory subsuming several behavioral phenomena. In
sociology, the concept of social control has been used
to capture the ways in which individuals, communities,
and societies respond to a variety of forms of deviant
behavior.19 At first, social control referred to a society’s
capacity to regulate itself. Then it was employed to
indicate the more repressive and coercive forms of
top-down control in capitalist regimes. From the
1950s onwards, social control has been conceived
more narrowly in relationship to deviance and/or
crime: social control refers to those mechanisms that
are put into operation in response to crime, deviant
behavior, or other deviations from socially prescribed
norms.20
In this section, we will describe social control as a
decision tree, where branches represent more or less effi-
cient trajectories, possibly explored by our species
during its evolution. Social control will also be described
as a multi-action plan, specifying the conditions that
must be verified to achieve the end of the plan, that is,
reduce future costs caused to cooperators by non-coop-
erators. In the subsequent section, gossip will be argued
to score high on efficiency, as it allows costs to be dras-
tically reduced with respect to benefits.
Thinking of social control as a decision tree that spe-
cifies alternatives for action allows us to compare them
in terms of efficiency, that is, their respective costs and
benefits. As will be shown later on in this section, ordi-
nary communication acts on the side of benefits but is
unable to reduce costs. Instead, the special form of com-
munication that is allowed by gossip, taking advantage
of specific properties of the human mind, has the pecu-
liar effect of optimizing social control by reducing its
costs while keeping benefits constant.
2.1. Related work
Social control is a spontaneous, decentralized social
phenomenon, which allows the costs of prosocial
behavior to be redistributed over a population in
which altruists live side-by-side with non-altruists.
Some specific phenomena are usually subsumed under
the large heading of social control. This includes ostra-
cism21,22 and altruistic punishment. The latter is usually
defined as a costly aggression inflicted to cheaters by
members of the group who did not necessarily undergo
attacks from the punished, nor get direct benefits out of
the sanction applied.23
Some crucial questions concern the efficacy of cen-
tral versus decentralized forms of social control, and its
reproductive advantage over direct cooperative behav-
ior. Sociologists24–27 have been wondering about the
inter-relationships among cooperation and social con-
trol. In their perspective, social control could be defined
as second-order cooperation, that is, urging others to
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cooperate, although cooperation at one level does not
imply cooperation at the other level.
Social control represents a solution to a major prob-
lem of adaptation: how to cooperate in a mixed popu-
lation28 where non-altruists are known to out-compete
altruists.29
This problem, known as the puzzle of coopera-
tion,30,31 was given many specific solutions:
(a) partner selection, based on (i) memory of previous
experience,32 (ii) observation of others’ deals,33




An operational variant of the last one, named strong
reciprocity,36,37 has received considerable attention in
the last decade. Gintis38 developed an analytical model
in which, under a given condition, strong reciprocity
can emerge through group selection. Bowles and
Gintis39 used computer simulations to test the validity
of the model, designing an egalitarian society of
hunter–gatherers divided into three subpopulations:
Reciprocators (R), Cooperators (C), and Selfish (S).
Only Reciprocators punish shirkers and they do so at
a personal cost that is by definition lower than the costs
of cooperation. Results clearly point to the evolution-
ary role of strong reciprocators. After the first few tour-
naments of the simulation, the rate of shirking and the
fitness of Selfish agents lower dramatically, while the
payoffs of Cooperators and Reciprocators increase
after the initial collapse. Even more interestingly,
Cooperators will never reach either the Selfish or the
Reciprocator payoffs, but the population will not be
invaded by cheaters.
The theory of strong reciprocity raises some ques-
tions. Firstly, how did strong reciprocity and more gen-
erally altruistic punishment evolve? Was it a sudden
single mutation that proved adaptive or one step in a
complex algorithm prompting different solutions to the
problems of adaptation?
Secondly, why should one be willing to perform
altruistic punishing? To define punishment as less
costly than cooperation provides no conclusive
answer to this question: why should a costly behavior
explain the evolution of an even more costly one? To
make sense, this hypothesis should imply that punish-
ment is a low-cost behavior, but this is not so obvious,
especially if we consider that it may lead to simulta-
neous or later counter-attacks.
Let us now examine alternatives to punishment, ana-
lyzing the respective efficiency in terms of costs-to-
benefits, and compare their competitive advantages.
2.2. Plan for social control
Social control should not only be seen as a decision tree
but also as a sequence of actions, a multi-action plan in
which at least two action levels can be distinguished. At
the top level we find the end of the plan, reducing future
costs caused to cooperators by non-cooperators. The
major end of social control can be achieved either by
avoiding the bad guys or by punishing them. The
former option, in turn, can be realized by mechanisms
of partner selection or by a generalized form of ostra-
cism. Bad guys may simply be avoided by the single
cooperator when choosing partners for its own utility
(partner selection), or may be shut out from the group
as a whole (ostracism). As will be discussed next, the
respective costs and benefits of these two options vary
considerably.
At the lower level of the plan stands a necessary
condition for applying any specific strategy of social
control. To perform it, social controllers need first to
discriminate between the good and the bad. How
do they find this out? Both directly, through the
memory of previous experience, and indirectly, building
on others’ experience. But how do we access the expe-
rience of others? There are two solutions: either by
observing others interacting (the well-known image
score),33,40 or by exchanging information with them,
that is, through communication.41
2.2.1. Comparing efficiency. One mechanism for
deciding among different options for social control is
to evaluate their respective efficiencies in terms of costs
and benefits.
Starting from the bottom, let us look at the costs and
benefits of identification when the group size makes
re-encounters unlikely. Under such a condition, the
benefits of direct experience are low as it is difficult to
meet the same partner again; instead, its costs are high,
because part of the information acquired has been paid
at a fairly high price (being cheated).
As to indirect information acquisition, onlookers are
usually unharmed witnesses of social encounters.
However, as the observation window is generally lim-
ited, they get only moderate, but low-cost, benefits.
With communication, instead, the basin of information
can potentially extend to the whole group. Hence,
although information can be false or mistaken, benefits
are much larger. Still, costs are also high, for at least
three reasons: (a) information may be transmitted to
the wrong recipient, providing them with precious
information that can be used to exploit other altruists;
(b) information transmitted can be wrong, causing
damage to the recipient and provoking their retaliation;
(c) information conveying a bad evaluation and
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including the source’s identity may sooner or later get
to the ears of the evaluation’s target, leading them to
take revenge against the initial informer.
If we compare alternatives in identification, the most
efficient alternative seems to be the observation of
others’ experience, but this option does not allow one
to collect much information, it requires a consistent
amount of time, and it is particularly inadequate in
large social groups.
Let us now turn to reactions. Once the non-altruists
have been identified, one is faced with two alternative
reactions: avoidance and punishment. Avoidance is
consequent to either banning the bad guys from the
whole group, or individual agents excluding them
from their partnerships. Banning is highly beneficial,
if efficacious, but is rather expensive, requiring a con-
tinuous deployment of resources in patrolling the
group’s boundaries. The benefits of individual partner
selection in turn are compensated by the high proba-
bility of error and the missed deterrence.
What about active punishment? Benefits, as shown
by Bowles and Gintis,39 are high, potentially including
also some deterrent effect. However, and unlike what
was supposed by these authors, costs are also high,
amounting to the costs of punishment, which can rea-
sonably be assumed to be lower than the costs of coop-
eration, plus the costs of potential retaliations by the
punished.
To sum up, in both levels of the social control plan,
benefits are high when costs are also high (see Table 1).
Under these conditions, it is difficult to account for a
highly distributed system of social control: why should
group members sustain such a burden? Why and how
did social control evolve at all? Which solution could it
provide to the puzzle of cooperation?
2.3. Optimize social control
How do we improve the efficiency of social control?
One way to do so is raising the benefits of strategies.
With reactions, the benefits of avoidance heavily
depend on the mechanisms of identification, which
will be examined below. Those of punishment depend
on the efficacy of deterrence, and ultimately on the
credibility and authority of the punisher, which are
essentially subjective features. In identification, the
benefits depend on the dimension of the network of
agents exchanging information: any other mechanism
is clearly less beneficial. Benefits increase with the
number of agents participating in the network. The
question is how incentive agents participate, if costs
remain high.
Let us now turn to costs. Assuming that to reduce
the costs of punishment is beyond control, the only
means left is to reduce the costs of identification. As
previously argued, the efficiency of avoidance ulti-
mately depends on the mechanism of communication.
Hence, we can formulate some preliminary
conclusions.
1st conclusion: to optimize social control implies reduc-
ing the costs of cheaters’ identification.
As one’s own experience and others’ observations
will never be able to equal communication in the
amount of information acquired, we can draw another
conclusion.
2nd conclusion: to optimize social control implies
reducing the costs of communication.
The efficiency of social control, that is, its advantage
in solving the puzzle of cooperation, depends on the
mechanism of communication. The less detrimental
the communication, the higher the incentive for group
members to participate in it, the greater the quantity of
information circulating in the system, and finally the
more efficient the system of control.
The consequent question then is: how did our species
solve the problem of communication, reducing its costs
so as to provide an incentive for group members to
participate? In the next section, we will argue that
gossip provides a solution to this problem. Indeed, we
can formulate our main conjecture.
Table 1. In this table the costs and benefits of identifying and punishing selfish agents are summarized. Experience implies Low (L)
benefits and High (H) costs; observation provides only Mild (M) benefits without any costs, whereas communication has High benefits
but also High costs. In the right-hand part the costs and benefits of two different forms of reaction, Avoidance and Punishment, are
also indicated
Identification Reaction
Experience Observation Communication Avoidance Punishment
Benefits L M H M H
Costs H – H – H
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Hypothesis: gossip evolved because it enabled our spe-
cies to solve a major problem of adaptation, that is, it
reduces the costs of communication in social control.
Dunbar5 suggests that gossip evolved as an adaptive
response to a selective pressure towards enlarging hom-
inids’ settlements. In his work, gossip is argued to have
evolved taking advantage of a human cognitive mech-
anism by providing incentive to participate in social
control, because it lowers its costs while keeping its
benefits constant (as will be shown below, spreading
meta-evaluation inhibits retaliation).
Moreover, the importance of cultural evolution for
the spreading and maintenance of social behaviors has
attracted broad attention in recent decades (for a
review, see Henrich and Henrich42).
In this work, we build on the idea that the combina-
tion of genetic and cultural evolutionary traits have
favored the appearance of gossip and that, thanks to
this specific mechanism, gossip enabled humans to
reduce the costs of communication in social control.
Let us now turn to a cognitively grounded theory of
social evaluation, from which we derive the main prop-
erties of gossip.
3. A cognitive theory of gossip
Since the appearing of Gluckman’s article on gossip
among Makwa Indians,2 gossiping has received much
attention by scholars coming from different disciplines
(for example, see the contributions by Dunbar,1
Barkow,3 Goodman and Ben-Ze’ev,4 Gintis et al.,6
Baumeister et al.,7 Wert and Salovey,8 Ellickson,43
and Noon and Delbridge44). It is worth noticing that
most of these accounts provide interesting theories
about the functional aspects of gossip, but they fail to
describe the internal motivations to gossip.
Gossiping requires choosing an addressee, selecting
the topic, and deciding in which way an information
has to be transmitted. These decisions all follow from
the epistemic and motivational representations individ-
uals hold or, in other terms, from their beliefs and
goals. For instance, gossip can be used for strategic
purposes, that is, to influence other individuals by gen-
erating new beliefs and goals, thus modifying their
behavior.
In order to describe gossip from a cognitive view-
point, we first need to characterize it as a process
through which social evaluations are transmitted. An
evaluation is social when an agent is considered as
a means to achieve the evaluator’s goals in terms of
some standards or norms.45 Consider the example:
‘John is a good teacher’. There is an agent (John) who
is evaluated with regard to the goal of the evaluator of
receiving/providing high-standard education. Humans
can represent and transmit social evaluations in two
different ways: either as image or as reputation.46
In the former case, the source of the evaluation is
explicitly stated and this implies an assumption about
the truth value of that information. Therefore, image is
defined as a social evaluation – regarding another
agent’s competence, behavior, attitudes, etc. – that the
agent assumes to be true. When an agent reports it to
others, they transmit it as one’s own evaluation of a
given target. An agent may also report the image that
someone else formed about a given target. In this case,
they may not assume it to be true, but there is another
defined agent who does.
On the other hand, in reputation the evaluation is not
necessarily assumed to be true, nor it is traced to a def-
inite source. Reputation designates a meta-evaluation,
that is, a belief about an evaluation. In a sense, reputa-
tion is a collectively held meta-evaluation because there
are agents believing that some others, preferably in their
group, believe that a given agent is told to have some
features.
This difference is not inconsequential and leads us to
point out that gossip for social control has evolved
thanks to the following properties of reputation
transmission:
1. there is no commitment of the speaker on the eval-
uation’s truth value;
2. there is no responsibility about the evaluation’s cred-
ibility and consequences (‘I am told that. . .’).
These properties of reputation transmission result in
several interesting effects at the group level. In partic-
ular, transmitting an inaccurate reputation leads to less
severe consequences than spreading an inaccurate
image, as the agent who spreads it is not responsible
for it. Reputation is anonymous in itself: it circulates
in the social network but its origin is unknown.
Therefore, reputation spreading is easier than image
transmission and, once circulated, reputation is also
more difficult to modify. This is mainly due to the
fact that it is practically impossible to trace a belief
about others’ beliefs back to its origins and to those
who hold it.
Regarding the agents involved, gossip has a triadic
structure in which we can distinguish the following.
A gossiper: an agent who has the goal to spread
information.
A topic: an agent whose behaviors, attitudes,
choices, and emotions are the topic of the communica-
tion. The target belongs to the same group as the gos-
siper and receiver and they are judged according to the
group’s rules and habits.
A receiver (or more than one): one or more agents
chosen from the gossiper to be told about the target.
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Receivers belong to the same social network, sharing
the same knowledge and values of the gossiper and
gossiped. Choosing the receiver is pivotal to achieve
the gossiper’s goals: the receiver can be the actual
target of communication or they can serve as a vehicle
to reach the intended target.
Reputation and gossip are based on a specific form
of social intelligence evolved by humans for more gen-
eral reasons, that is, the ability to form and manipulate
mental representations on the mental states of one’s
peers (known as mindreading47). Moreover, several
studies18,48,49 point out the existence of cognitive mech-
anisms or neural substrates evolved especially for
taking into account the presence of others and the pos-
sibility of being evaluated by them. Reputation can
work as a useful guidance when making decisions
about possible interactions, evaluating candidate part-
ners, understanding and predicting their behaviors, and
showing one’s acceptance of the group’s values. The
importance of such a capacity for our species’ adapta-
tion is hardly questionable; making assumptions on
others’ internal states allows us to anticipate and pos-
sibly prevent their future behaviors, choosing the most
appropriate conduct. The capacity to form and trans-
mit meta-beliefs has also been pivotal to the evolution
of reputation and gossip. By transmitting meta-evalua-
tions, to the point that the source of evaluation gets
lost, our ancestors could exploit the benefits of commu-
nication, while sustaining its costs, thus generating a
distributed and cheap form of social control.
According to Ingram et al.,50 in systems of indirect rec-
iprocity, reputation is a powerful signal of the quality
of the potential partner, and communication about
others’ reputations greatly enlarges the possibilities
for cooperation. This has created a selective pressure
on humans to evolve specific cognitive mechanisms to
represent and manipulate their own reputation in the
eyes of other group members.
In traditional societies, in which social relationships,
alliances, and feuds heavily rely on the accuracy of
social evaluations and their transmission, gossip repre-
sents a powerful means to apply social control without
bearing the costs of retaliation.51 Through reputation
spreading, individuals can circulate evaluations to
either condemn or praise their peers’ behaviors, in
order not only to share their views with the rest of
their group, but also to influence them indirectly.
The cognitive model of gossip leads us to our third
conclusion:
3rd conclusion: by transmitting meta-evaluations, gos-
sipers (a) do not commit to the truth values of nested
evaluations (b) nor take responsibility over their
consequences.
4. From model to data
Our analysis of costs and benefits of social control,
along with the cognitive account of gossip, set the
stage for the discussion of ethnographic data and the
presentation of simulation results. Before going on, we
want to briefly recap our conclusions, whose relevance
and appropriateness will be supported by observations
from traditional societies. On the other hand, our
hypothesis will gain support from data on artificial
agents exchanging different kinds of information.
Moving from a definition of gossip as a ‘social cog-
nitive process based on meta-evaluations’, we claim
that it allow agents to avoid (i) commitment to the
truth value of the evaluations transmitted and (ii)
responsibility over the consequences of such transmis-
sion. Given the aforementioned properties, gossip pre-
vents retaliation and could therefore evolve as a means
for reducing the costs of distributed social control. This
claim will be supported by two different kinds of natu-
ral evidences and artificial data. On one hand, reports
from traditional societies lend support to the proposed
model, whereas data from agent-based social simula-
tions (ABSSs) will show more precisely the costs and
benefits of different kinds of information, in different
settings.
We claim that gossip evolved as a solution to the
problem of adaptation posed by social control, because
gossip permits one to reduce the costs of cheaters’ iden-
tification, but it is also effective in reducing the costs
of communication by transmitting meta-evaluations.
Agents endowed with the capability of holding meta-
beliefs and acting upon them do not commit to the
truth values of nested evaluations nor take responsibil-
ity over their consequences.
Meta-beliefs reduce the potentially damaging effects
of communication, thus providing group members with
high incentives to participate in it. This, at the group
level, will result in an increasing of the quantity of
information circulating in the system, and will finally
end up with a more efficient control.
5. Gossip in human societies:
Ethnographic evidence
To what extent does the ethnography of gossip match
with our description? In this section we will report on
evidence collected by ethnographers in different tradi-
tional societies all around the world, and compare
it with the model described above to check whether
gossip’s features, functions, and rituals as described
by scholars working in the field may lend support to
our model. We will restrict our analysis to five main
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examples: the Nakulalelae’s fatufatu; the Talanoa in the
Fiji islands; the use of gossip among the Hopi; the case
of Kwanga; and that of Makah.
5.1. Fatufatu
Among the Nukulaelae, who live in a Polynesian atoll
of the Central Pacific, Besnier52 found fatufatu, a vac-
uous, ‘women’s’ language, strongly disparaged by the
high-status part of the society to which only men are
entitled to belong. Nonetheless, that of fatufatu is a real
art, requiring considerable expertise and a dramatic
competence. Fatufatu is an interactive activity.
Initialized by a single member of the group, it is trans-
mitted to the audience through a manipulative strategy
in which the recipients become co-producers of the
gossip. The speaker often pauses dramatically at stra-
tegic moments, waiting for interlocutors’ interjections
or comments on the scandalous content of the narra-
tive. This behavior has been interpreted as a way of
sharing the responsibility for what is told, while at the
same time allowing the speaker to maintain control
upon the floor.
5.2. Talanoa
Talanoa is the name of an idle talk of Hindu inhabi-
tants from the village of Bhatgaon in Fiji, as described
by Brenneis.53 Here, reputation is the kernel of social
hierarchy and reputation management is one of the
core activities of social life. Gossip is created jointly
by all participants and this relationship between the
gossiper and the audience leads to two main conse-
quences: it does not cause sanctions or retaliation and
makes recipients form opinions ‘of their own’. A
requirement of Talanoa emerging from transcriptions
is the continuous and repeated use of the word ‘bole’
(literally the third singular person of the present tense
of the verb ‘to speak’), used to mean ‘I have heard
saying’ or ‘they say’ that refers to an indefinite speaker
or source. In both cases, the use of ‘bole’ allows the
speaker to keep at a distance from what s/he says: s/
he is not reporting on his/her own opinion but on voice
or rumors. Moreover, Talanoa transcriptions cannot be
understood without previous knowledge, due to a
heavy use of metaphors, irony, and ambiguous refer-
ences that suggest that what is hidden is more than
what is said. Gossip among Bhatgaon people has
three main features:
(a) indefinite characters;
(b) targets are never clearly identified;
(c) the authorship of a particular gossip is blurred.
5.3. The Hopi
Cox54 studied gossip between two political factions in
11 villages within the Hopi reservation in Arizona.
Moving from the view of gossip put forward by
Brison,55 Cox tried to figure out to what extent gossip
promotes or discards group unity. Gossip starts when
political authority is monopolized by one group and the
powerless party uses gossip to keep authority under
control and form alliances. This form of control is espe-
cially powerful because victims cannot escape the effect
of accusation, since the source is not revealed, and evi-
dence is neither brought about nor disconfirmed.
5.4. The Kwanga
More recently, Brison55 studied the Kwanga, a tribe of
hunter–gatherers in Papua New Guinea that live in
numerous villages characterized by complex social net-
works. Initiated men form a community of equals in
which attempts to command lead to loss of support.
The Kwanga used to hold long community meetings to
discuss matters of common concern, during which gossip
was spread about men as a means for social control and
for gaining prestige. If asked to produce evidence, the
accused resorted to a conventional solution: they claimed
their words were just talk, rumors, thus lowering the
importance of what they said without denying it.
5.5. The Makah Indians
In a pioneering work on gossip, Colson56 described this
activity among Makah Indians, a small group of Native
Americans from USA. In this population, gossip is used
to criticize others and to question their social status.
Far from being disruptive, this activity helps the
group to build up a sense of cohesion; this is especially
important in that context in which their cultural iden-
tity was in danger of extinction due to attempts to turn
them into American citizens. The Makah gossip has a
twofold function: it enforces the group’s identity while,
at the same time, it works as a tool to maintain equality
between all group members. Being a Makah means to
be able to gossip in the appropriate way, respecting the
ritual and being able to manage the topic, and strangers
cannot join the gossip circle.
To sum up, we find interesting features in all four
examples. Gossip leaves indefinite the target (see the
Kwanga) and the source (see the use of bole), is
spread in absence of a target (Talanoa), cannot be fal-
sified and is unaccountable (Hopi), and maintains
group values and identity (Makah), but also creates
alliance57,58 of the underprivileged against the luckier,
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prevents retaliation (many), is fun (Talanoa), and
deplorable (Fatufatu). Gossip spreading means to
transmit impersonal narratives, without any commit-
ment on truth value, with indefinite authorship, and
indefinite targets, all traits that are common in small
acephalous communities (see also Boehm51) in which
members are interdependent and act covertly instead
of taking direct action that might offend others.
Ethnographic evidence seems to provide support to
our cognitive analysis, showing that universal features
of gossip converge on the transmission of a reported-on
evaluation (reputation). This prevents retaliation, spar-
ing participants both the costs of acquiring informa-
tion, and the costs of transmitting it, thus providing
incentives for group members to participate in social
control.
So far, we have analyzed social control in its atomic
actions, and found out that under the need, or selective
pressure, to optimize efficiency, the human species
might have evolved a special mechanism for transmit-
ting evaluations to one another. Ordinary communica-
tion, in which agents commit to the truth value of
messages and take responsibility over its consequences,
reduces the costs of obtaining information, but in the
case of social evaluations, this exposes the source to the
risk of retaliation. Here is where human cognition went
to the rescue of the species members, by providing them
with the capacity to discriminate between image
and reputation and to spread reputation, without
taking responsibility for its truth value and for its
consequences.
Gossip in traditional societies seems perfectly suited
to allow members of the group to exercise social control
on one another, while at the same time preventing the
escalation of violence and retaliation. This in turn
might have allowed for enlarging the group, affording
partner selection and informational exchange among
non-familiar agents.
So far we have tested our model of gossip. What
about our hypothesis about the role of gossip in opti-
mizing social control? In the last section of this paper,
we will turn to artificial societies as a virtual experimen-
tal setting in which to test our theory.
6. Gossip in artificial societies
Several attempts have been made to model and use rep-
utation in artificial societies, especially in two sub-fields
of information technologies, that is, computerized
interaction (with a special reference to electronic mar-
ketplaces) and agent-mediated interaction (for a review,
see Mui et al.59).
Models of reputation for multi agent systems appli-
cations60–62 clearly present interesting new ideas and
advances over conventional online reputation systems,
and more generally over the notion of global reputa-
tion, or centrally controlled image. Indeed, models of
trust and reputation abound in this field (for a couple
of exhaustive reviews, see Ramchurn et al.63 and
Sabater and Sierra64).
Here, we want to test the effectiveness of gossip in
promoting social control at the aggregate level, using
agent-based simulations (ABSs) in order to validate the
hypothesis drawn from the cognitive model. A similar
attempt to apply a sophisticated model of human cog-
nition to explain the evolution of social phenomena
has been made by Chavalarias,65 who included meta-
cognitive representations in his model of the evolution
of imitation rules.
In the previous sections we suggested that gossip
may have evolved because it enabled our species to
reduce the costs of communication in social control.
More specifically, we try to disentangle the effects of
reputation transmission from those produced by
image in two different systems. Artificial experiments
not only allow us to isolate the effects of identifying
cheaters and reacting to their actions, but also to eval-
uate to which extent the transmission of reputation can
positively affect partner selection while preserving
agents from being retaliated.
We will review two different studies in which the
spread of social evaluations is intended to facilitate
partner selections. In the first work, developed using
the REPAGE platform (for a more detailed account,
see Sabater et al.,66 Conte et al.,67 and Giardini et al.68),
the role of information reliability has been addressed,
with the aim of understanding how false information
can affect agents’ decision-making processes. In the
second study, an artificial industrial district was mod-
eled and the effects of image and reputation on the
selection of reliable suppliers and consequent product
quality were tested.
Regarding the first study,69 agents are situated in
a market-like scenario designed with the aim of repro-
ducing the simplest possible setting in which informa-
tion is a valuable but scarce commodity. Agents are
endowed with a specific cognitive architecture, called
REPAGE, which provides evaluations on potential
partners and is fed with information from others plus
outcomes from direct experience. To select good part-
ners, agents need to form and update own social eval-
uations; hence, they must exchange evaluations with
one another.
The REPAGE cognitive architecture can be used by
artificial autonomous agents in different scenarios, be
they multi-agent system (MAS) applications, artificial
markets, or teamwork. It has been especially developed
as a module for social reasoning and decision making
that, as an output, supplies advices about a given target
and how to interact with it. Furthermore, this module
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has been designed to provide information to be plugged
into the planner of an agent, information about a set of
possible solutions to improve the reliability of the pro-
vided information.
In brief, the REPAGE architecture, as shown in
Figure 1, is composed of three main elements: a
memory, a set of components called detectors, and
the analyzer.
REPAGE is not only a passive module the agent can
query to obtain information about image and the rep-
utation of another agent, but it also permits agents to
manage the information they get in order to decide
among alternative courses of action that can be fol-
lowed to improve the reliability of the available infor-
mation. After the information received has been filtered
and manipulated, new predicates are added to the main
memory. The planner uses the information in the main
memory to produce plans. By means of the analyzer,
REPAGE always suggests new actions to the planner in
order to improve the accuracy of existing images and
reputations. The planner can decide whether to look for
new information by asking informers or directly inter-
acting with other agents, in order to gain useful insights
to improve the system’s response accuracy.
The simulation environment is market-like and con-
sists of given percentages of Buyers (Bs) and Sellers
(Ss). Bs need to find good Ss endowed with a given
stock of products, but Ss’ products are subject to deple-
tion. Once an agent’s stock is exhausted, that S disap-
pears and the B needs to find a new one. There are
differences in quality of products, therefore Bs look
for agents selling high-quality goods. In this setting,
information plays a crucial role in favoring the discov-
ery of good sellers, but, at the same time, agents have
an incentive to cheat. Limited resources make informa-
tional cheating a strategic choice that prevents one’s
own good sellers from being exploited by other
agents, but informational cheaters are punished with
false information.
Under these experimental conditions, does reputa-
tion transmission make any difference with respect
to image transmission? Results reported by
Quattrociocchi et al.69 and collected in 28 market sce-
narios with varying percentages of cheaters and differ-
ent distributions of good and bad products show that
the performance of the system changes not only with
respect to the average of cheaters in the population, but
it is also affected by the specific kind of circulating
evaluation.
Two conditions were tested: L1 in which only image
was transmitted and L2 in which agents circulated and
received both image and reputation. In Figure 2 the
quality of products for different cheating rates is dis-
played. Image is less sensitive to informational cheating
and it guarantees low but stable results. On the other
hand, reputation is more sensitive for given parameter
values; it favors identification of liars and can cope with
a large amount of cheaters (60%) before collapsing.
This seems to support our hypothesis about the role
of information in lowering and distributing the costs of
social control, but it is also interesting because it sup-
ports our claim about the importance of choosing
between two different mental objects. Although encour-
aging, these results pose the problem that REPAGE is a
highly complex architecture whose high computational
complexity prevents it from being applied in rich envi-
ronments and limits its applicability to more complex
settings.
In order to test our theory in a more realistic market-
like environment, a different scenario, in which firms
are modeled as agents organized into three different
layers, has been implemented.70,71
This model, called SOCRATE, has been developed
in order to provide empirical support to the claim that
in industrial districts actors are embedded in networks
of informal relationships that may heavily affect inno-
vation and economic performance.72 In industrial dis-
tricts, agents’ access to information and goods are
partly dependent on their personal relationships, and
Figure 1. A graphic representation of the REPAGE architec-
ture. In the MEMORY module the different predicates coming
from the DETECTORS are stored according to their typology
(reputation, image, etc.). The main task of the ANALYZER is
to propose actions that (i) can improve the accuracy of the
predicates in the REPAGE memory and (ii) can solve cognitive
dissonances in order to reduce uncertainty (adapted from
Sabater et al.66).
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reputation plays a relevant role in relationships among
firms.73
For this reason, an ideal-typical cluster has been
designed, and agents took part in two kinds of
exchanges: informational exchange and material
exchange. In the latter case, they had to choose the
best available supplier in order to deliver high-quality
products. When their usual suppliers were not avail-
able, they relied on informers, that is, other agents
transmitting evaluations, in order to avoid the costs
of direct interaction and to acquire useful information.
Two different settings were tested: an image setting, in
which agents could transmit only their personal evalu-
ations, thus exposing themselves to the risk of retalia-
tion, and a reputation setting. In this latter condition,
evaluations were communicated without reporting the
source, so that reactions against bad informers were de
facto impossible.
We tested the model for two different percentages of
informational cheaters in the population. For each tick
of the simulation, results of past interactions with sup-
pliers are recorded, while informers’ suggestions are
stored in a different table. When agents receive a false
image, they retaliate by providing cheaters with false
information (basically, they suggest the worst supplier
from their list of actual interactions). On the contrary,
when they receive a false reputation, they cannot retal-
iate because they do not know the source of it.
The results obtained from 10 simulations per each
experimental condition (300 agents on three layers
interacting for 300 simulation ticks) showed that the
quality of products was higher in the cluster with
reputational information, compared to the cluster
with image, for the same percentages of cheating (see
Figure 3). We also replicated the results by varying the
distribution of firms on the three layers, thus designing
a market with harsh competition for good partners, and
we found that the exchange of reputational information
also allows the whole cluster to obtain higher profits.
Figure 2. A summary of main results obtained with the REPAGE architecture. Image is less sensitive to informational cheating and
leads to low quality but results are stable. On the other hand, reputation is more sensitive and for given parameter values favors the
identification of cheaters. However, quality of information collapses when the cheating rate exceeds 60% (adapted from
Quattrociocchi et al.69).
Figure 3. Results obtained with the SOCRATE model. This
figure shows the average quality of production for different
cheating rates both in the Image condition (IC) and the
Reputation condition (RC). Reputation spreading sustains quality
of production even in those cases in which the percentage of
cheaters is very high (75% of the total number of agents)
(adapted from Giardini et al.70).
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In other words, social information gave rise to dif-
ferent configurations: image-based clusters performed
better when cheaters were few but quality of production
dramatically decreased for higher levels of cheating.
Conversely, clusters in which agents exchanged reputa-
tion were more flexible and robust when the number of
cheaters was high, and the cluster’s quality of products
was only partially affected. In addition, agents in these
networks explored the environment by both spreading
and using untested evaluations, so that innovation was
promoted through the inclusion of new partners and
informers.
How should we interpret the main results of both
studies? Essentially, they show that gossip allows
agents to solve the dilemma arising from the fact that
resources are scarce, so lying about sellers and suppliers
with high-quality products is a way to protect them
from exploitation by others, but false information is
punished. Reputation is a means to punish untruthful
informers without bearing the costs of further retalia-
tion and this, in a quite counterintuitive way, protects
the system from collapsing. In addition, for certain per-
centages of cheating rates, in both studies, agents
exchanging reputation perform better than agents
transmitting image, showing how relevant the role of
reputation is in enhancing the quality of products. This
result is found both in markets characterized by scarce
good sellers and in industrial clusters with a limited
number of good producers, even with considerable
informational cheating. Why is this?
The key for the success of gossip is tolerance. Gossip
allows for social evaluation to circulate in larger infor-
mational networks as compared to what happens in
image-based networks, because it is a forgiving strat-
egy. In reputation networks, informational cheating is
less punished than in image networks. Hence, gossip
allows for partner selection at the material level,
giving it up at the informational level. Social informa-
tion circulates in a wider group, providing members
with an incentive to participate in the exchange of
information. The incentive takes the form of a preven-
tive defense: gossipers protect the identity of the eval-
uation source, thus reducing the chances for retaliation.
As more information circulates in the gossip network
and more agents participate in it, the average chances
for agents to perform partner selection and find good
partners for exchange (market) or cooperation (indus-
trial district) increase, keeping low the costs of commu-
nication, which is exactly what we expected to find.
In sum, gossip allows one to select against material
cheaters, by putting up with informational cheaters.
Trust networks, that is, image-based networks in
which members trust each other as informers, are pro-
gressively bound to shrink, allowing only an always
smaller number of agents to find good partners and
build on an increasingly lower capital of experience
and information. On the contrary, the dimension of
gossip networks may even exceed the dimension of
material partnership, allowing a larger number of
agents to access the good sellers and therefore accumu-
lating and circulating into the network a growing social
knowledge.
However, there is also the bad side of the coin. In
gossip networks, the information circulating is less
accurate and more easily corrupted. Hiding themselves
behind the shutter of an indefinite source, people may
spread all sorts of lies and calumnies. If it is an incen-
tive to participate in the informational network, gossip
is bound to incentive deception as well. What is the
good of exchanging information, if this generates infor-
mational lemons?
Our findings provide only a partial answer to this
specific question. They show that, for given values
assigned to parameters, the gossip network is robust
until the number of informational cheaters exceeds
the majority of the population, which indeed is a
rather unlikely event. Of course, nothing can put up
with a thoroughly corrupt social environment. A
more satisfactory, if not complete, answer requires fur-
ther simulation studies, exploring the parameters’ space
to extensively check the quantitative and qualitative
conditions under which the theory is verified.
7. Conclusions
The academic interest for reputation is constantly
increasing, and the importance of social evaluations is
now widely acknowledged across a wide range of dif-
ferent disciplines. In this work we have crossed disci-
plinary boundaries to merge cognitive science,
ethnography, and computer science with the aim of
investigating the role that reputation and gossip play
in social control. Exercising social control roughly
means to isolate and punish cheaters. However, pun-
ishment is costly and it inevitably implies the problem
of second-order cooperation. Moving from a theoreti-
cal analysis of social control we showed that it requires
two activities: identifying the violators and avoiding or
punishing them. Punishment is highly efficacious but
expensive for both the victims and the executors,
whereas exclusion is a less explicit mechanism, and
therefore is less persuasive, but is inherently self-
protecting.
In any case, whether punishment or exclusion, what
secures high benefits in social control is finding out the
cheaters. Communication is by far more beneficial than
any other identification system, but is not for free.
Indeed, ordinary communication, in which the source
of evaluation concerning unreliable partners is known,
entails serious risks of undergoing retaliation.
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The question is how to reduce these risks and capitalize
not only on information acquisition, but also on infor-
mation transmission. We claimed that gossiping, that
is, the spreading of information about third parties, can
provide a solution when reputation is transmitted.
Contrasting the transmission of information in which
the source is hidden, what Conte and Paolucci46 call
reputation, and image, that is information with an undi-
sclosed source, we put forward the hypothesis that
gossip reduces the costs of social control while leaving
its benefits intact.
We found support for our model of gossip in ethno-
graphic data that show that in traditional societies all
around the world gossip presents some common fea-
tures so that gossipers circulate each other’s evaluations
without committing to the truth value of the informa-
tion, thus preventing retaliations and the escalation of
counter-punishment. We also tested our hypothesis
about the effects of image and reputation for social
control using data coming from ABSs in which evalu-
ations were used as a means for partner selection. In the
first study the emphasis was on results coming from
REPAGE, a computational system for partner selec-
tion based on a model of reputation (beliefs about
shared voice on a given target), image (own evalua-
tions), and their interplay. In the second study simpler
agent architecture was tested in an ideal-typical indus-
trial district in which agents had to maximize the qual-
ity of their production. In both cases, reputation was
the most efficient modality of transmission regarding
partner selection and social control. Even more inter-
estingly, our results showed also that the system’s
response to different percentages of cheaters varied
depending on the kind of information circulating in
the system itself.
Although the relevance of reputation for coopera-
tion and partner selection has been widely acknowl-
edged,6,33,48,74 it is often considered as an alternative
to other and more plausible hypotheses, such as
‘strong reciprocity’.17 Moreover, few attempts have
been made so far to link the evolution of reputation
and punishment. One of the most recent ones75
simply introduces a ‘punishment score’ as a measure
of an individual’s reputation of being a punisher. This
score is analogous to the ‘image score’33,40 and it allows
punishers to receive more collaboration in the future,
contributing to the evolutionary stability of cooperative
behavior.
A completely underrated issue in studies of reputa-
tion is its specificity as opposed to general communica-
tion. An interesting exception is the work of Ingram
et al.,50 in which they claim that reputation played a
role in the evolution of the uniquely human cognitive
structures needed to deal with the complexity of creat-
ing and manipulating social evaluations. Analogously,
we claim that relying on third parties’ evaluations when
deciding whether to interact with strangers is a specific
human feature. Relying on this kind of information is
crucial in order to avoid costly interactions and it per-
mits one to save time and to be protected against
cheaters.
Giving incentive to participants for sharing socially
relevant information, gossip allows group members to
accumulate a large social knowledge capital through
which a large number of agents can find the good part-
ners. Cruel with regard to suspected material cheaters,
often unable to defend themselves from accusations,
gossip is a forgiving strategy with regard to liars, and
this might be one of the reasons why it is blamed both
in traditional and in modern societies. However, this
did not prevent gossip from proving adaptive in the
evolution of our species, contributing to the emergence
of cooperation in large social groups that include altru-
ists and non-altruists.
These evolutionary aspects will be addressed by
future studies, aimed at designing a simulation model
to test the effects of gossip on different kinds of socie-
ties, modeled after the traditional societies described by
ethnographers. We are interested in understanding to
what extent gossip affects groups with different social
organizations, both in terms of group cohesion and
social control. Another future strand of research will
consist of merging this theory with social network anal-
ysis, in order to test how gossip spreads in networks,
whether the network topology affects the gossip trans-
mission, and how socio-technical systems should be
designed to support gossip.
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